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Australia’s status as the only state with a policy of mandatory indefinite detention of all unlawful non-
citizens, including asylum seekers, who are within Australian territory is a fact that is both well-known 
and frequently cited. From its inception, mandatory immigration detention was touted as ‘the method 
of deterrence for those seeking asylum onshore’ and since then ‘mandatory detention has been at the 
forefront of a deterrence as control and control as deterrence discourse’2. The imagined subjects of 
deterrence are frequently asylum seekers presented as ‘bogus’ or as economic migrants, and the sites 
for control are Australia’s ‘immigration program’ and borders. While these dual factors have animated 
the implementation and continuation of the policy for over 25 years, the contemporary practice and 
enforcement of detention in Australia presents a much more complex picture.  
 
While no sitting Australian Government has publicly resiled from the mandatory indefinite detention 
of all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ as they are classed in the legislation, the application of a mandatory 
detention policy to people deemed unlawful— and in particular asylum seekers who arrive without 
authorisation3 — has, for some time, been in major decline. In this chapter I explore shifts in the 
practices of onshore detention to argue that the mandatory detention of asylum seekers must be read 
alongside and in light of Australia’s bridging visa regime, and in particular the large number of asylum 
seekers released from detention and living in the Australian community on discretionary and short-term 
bridging visas. In general, bridging visas serve to temporarily regularise the legal status of people 
awaiting the resolution of a visa application, and for unlawful non-citizens they may allow for release 
from otherwise mandatory detention. Using crimmigration as a framework, this chapter argues that 
Australia’s bridging visa regime should not be analysed as a practice ancillary to the primary policy of 
mandatory detention, but as central to the logic and policy of punishment and deterrence of onshore 
asylum seekers seeking protection within Australian territory. The use of temporary bridging visas to 
release asylum seekers from detention is now central to the punishment and deterrence of unauthorised 
refugee arrivals.  
 
In analysing the bridging visa regime, the chapter focusses in particular on the growing use of broad 
visa cancellation powers against asylum seeker bridging visa holders. It addresses cancellation on both 
criminality grounds (including on the basis of criminal charges alone) and under the Asylum Seeker 
Code of Behaviour (‘the Code’),4 and analyses data accessed via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests 
that chart the use of the cancellation powers from 2014-2016. The bridging visa cancellation powers 
and policing of the Code constitute textbook examples of crimmigration practice, where criminal law 
and immigration law operate under conditions of ‘interchangeability and mutual enforcement’.5 
Criminal law is used against Bridging Visa Class E (BVE) holders to punish, to enforce racialised 
                                                           
1 Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney. 
2 Pickering and Lambert 2002, p. 78 (emphasis in original). 
3 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14, 189. 
4 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 116; Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2013).  
5 Aas 2014, p. 525. 
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immigration controls and to make asylum seekers deportable,6 just as immigration detention and 
deportation are justified as crime reduction strategies.7    
 
In analysing the use of the cancellation powers and the FOI data, the chapter also argues that as the 
result of visa cancellation on criminal and behavioural grounds asylum seekers are increasingly being 
excluded and punished in ways that are increasingly similar to criminalisation of the broader population 
of migrants and  ‘non-citizens’. For the approximately 19,500 asylum seekers classified as 'unauthorised 
maritime arrivals' currently living on BVEs, the use of bridging visa cancellation powers demonstrates 
that asylum seekers in Australia are increasingly subject to policing and control associated with the 
regulation via the ‘internal’ border – practices of exclusion traditionally exercised against racialised 
non-citizen populations who are not asylum seekers or the subject of (mandatory) indefinite detention 
– as well as crude 'external' border controls.8 That is, it is not only asylum seeker BVE holders’ mode 
of entry that is criminalised, but increasingly, criminal law and behavioural regulations are being used 
to punish and deter BVE holders while they are in the community, at the same time as the threat of re-
detention on almost any ground is preserved. For BVE holders, both the internal and external border 
are at play. At the same time, criminal cancellation powers are being used in concert with the systematic 
economic marginalisation of asylum seeker bridging visa holders, achieved via visa conditions limiting 
access to work and welfare, which have to date been the primary means employed by Australian 
Governments to punish and control bridging visa populations. 
 
In developing the above claims, Part I of the chapter traces several reforms to onshore mandatory 
detention, or more accurately, to the practice of temporary release of onshore asylum seekers from 
detention, which have taken place as the legal framework of mandatory indefinite detention has been 
maintained. Part II shifts to focus on practices of bridging visa cancellation, and the policing and 
surveillance of BVE holders. I then analyse recent data regarding BVE visa cancellation and 
enforcement of the Code of Behaviour, across 499 alleged breaches of the criminal law or Code from 
June 2014 to July 2016. 
 
The regulation of BVE holders using the Code and criminal law demonstrates how the regulation of 
non-citizens at the intersection of criminal and immigration law significantly exceeds each separate area 
of regulation and law. As Bosworth and Guild have traced, the use of criminal law powers against non-
citizens is not simply an example of ‘governance through crime’.9 Migration management and 
criminalisation exceed national and criminological accounts of law and order politics, to include ‘new’ 
crimes and modes of criminalisation ‘located on or beyond the border’, which ‘arise from and 
reformulate understandings of identity, community and justice’.10 That is, crimmigration and its 
management of racialized, non-citizen populations, while continuous with many past practices of 
racialized punishment and border control, is a unique practice with its own structure and logic. In this 
vein, the chapter reinforces Vázquez’s argument that, despite a history of interaction between race, 
crime and citizenship (in the US specifically) that long pre-dates crimmigration scholarship, the 
                                                           
6 See De Genova, 2002. 
7 See Aas 2014, pp. 25-26. As explained in the next section, BVE is a category of bridging visa available to applicants 
identified as unlawful non-citizens, including asylum seekers classified as ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’; see Migration 
Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 sub-cls 050, 051.  
8 See Weber 2013. 
9 See Garland 2003. 
10 Bosworth and Guild 2008, p. 704. 
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multiple dimensions, purposes and impacts of contemporary crimmigration have their own institutional 
structures, which are only beginning to emerge.11  
 
Before addressing the shifts in enforcement of detention against onshore asylum seekers, it is important 
to note that the decline in detention rates for onshore refugee arrivals is also a result of the aggressive 
externalisation of Australia’s deterrence policies, via both Australia’s militarised boat interception and 
turn-back policy, and what is known as offshore detention. That is, the establishment of Australian-
funded prison camps for refugees and asylum seekers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Indeed, the 
policing of Australia’s naval border has all but prevented asylum seekers from arriving in Australian 
territory.12 And, at the same time as the population of detained asylum seekers on the Australian 
mainland has decreased, the number of non-citizens being held in Australian detention centres due to 
visa cancellations on criminal grounds or the failure of a statutory ‘character’ test has been steadily 
increasing. As the Australian Department of Home Affairs itself reports, ‘[b]etween the 2013–14 and 
2016–17 … the number of visa cancellations on character grounds have increased by over 1400 per 
cent’.13 As at 2018, non-citizens whose visas have been cancelled on character grounds comprised the 
single largest population in Australian immigration detention.14 This issue is addressed in Billings and 
Hoang’s chapter in this collection.  
 
1 Detention and Release 
While the focus of this chapter is on the use of Bridging Visa Class E, Australian immigration law 
provides for a range of bridging visas. These visas serve to regularise the legal status of people awaiting 
the resolution of their immigration matters, which is achieved either via the grant of a valid visa or 
departure or deportation from Australian territory. In Australia, a BVE is available to certain non-
citizens who are either applying for a substantive visa or making arrangements to leave Australia and 
they allow BVE-holders either to avoid mandatory detention or to be released from immigration 
detention. There are two classes of BVE being a ‘general’ and a ‘protection visa’ class (050 and 051). 
Both categories of BVE are for people who are identified as unlawful non-citizens, including asylum 
seekers classified as ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’. 
 
Those investigating crimmigration and the architecture of migration and border control have long 
highlighted the penality of immigration detention. Immigration detention is necessarily situated within 
‘specific practices of policing and carceral geographies’.15 This is the case not least because: 
 
‘Interior enforcement’ cannot happen in the United States, Australia, and the European Union without 
capacities for surveillance and apprehension delegated to local authorities; nor can detention happen in 
the absence of existing jails. Imprisonment and detention involve similar processes of racialized 
entrapment, together generate economic vulnerability (and gain), and increasingly share sturdy legal and 
discursive practices of racialized criminalization.16  
                                                           
11 Vázquez 2015; see also Kaldelfos and Finnane; Gerrard and Boon-Kuo in this collection. Vázquez draws on work that 
reads crimmigration as a backlash against civil rights, and argues that ‘[i]n a continued attempt to limit the number of 
nonwhite individuals who entered and remained in the United States, the immigration system began to use criminal status as 
a proxy for race’; she also writes that ‘crimmigration must be defined as a portmanteau, an institutional structure in which 
criminal and immigration law have merged in various ways to create a singular and distinct concept with its own structure of 
laws, procedures and practices.’ Vázquez 2015, p. 607; McElrath et al 2014. On the often ignored continuities between 
current detention practices and histories of race, social control and detention in Australia, see Nethery 2012.  
12 In early 2017, the Government ‘celebrated’ 1000 days of no asylum boat arrivals and the successful interception and 
return of 30 boats and 765 people attempting 'illegal' entry; see Dutton 2017. 
13 Department of Home Affairs 2018.  
14 Refugee Council of Australia 2018a.  
15 Mountz et al. 2012. 
16 Mountz et al. 2012; see also Martin and Mitchelson 2009. 




Scholarship at the intersection of immigration control, criminal law and policing has, at the same time, 
examined the modes of racialised confinement of non-citizens outside of the physical sites of detention 
centres and prisons, in symbolic and actual spaces of ‘suspension and liminality, where detainees or 
non-citizens are expected to “wait out” their status regularisations’ in the absence of direct 
imprisonment.17  
 
Gaps between detention policy and practice in Australia, and between detention as law and discretionary 
release from detention, are central to understanding detention as a ‘core idea of migration control’.18  
For a significant period, mandatory indefinite detention has been the cornerstone of successive 
Australian Governments’ management of onshore refugees in both policy and practice. While it is not 
my intention to fully trace shifts in detention practices here, I nonetheless highlight several reforms to 
onshore detention and practices of temporary release of onshore asylum seekers from detention on 
BVEs. Critically, the shifts in onshore detention practice have mainly been achieved through policy 
change or the expanded exercise of existing discretions, rather than formal law reform. As a 
consequence, there is an ever-widening gap between the law of mandatory indefinite detention and the 
reality of regulating onshore asylum seekers, which is increasingly undertaken outside of imprisonment 
in closed detention centres.  
 
The disjuncture between government policy and government practice leads to confusing statements 
such as the following one currently on the Department of Home Affairs website: 
 
A person who does not hold a valid visa must be detained under the Migration Act 1958, however 
whether the person is placed in an immigration detention facility is determined using a risk-based 
approach.19  
 
The Department goes on to declare that while ‘the surge in illegal maritime arrivals saw the detention 
population peak at [around] 10,000 in July 2013’, under the current Government, ‘the reduction in boat 
arrivals over the past three years has seen the number of people in detention fall to around 1500 and has 
allowed the Government to close 17 immigration detention facilities by the end of 2018’.20 The 
Department also highlights that ‘illegal maritime arrivals’ (IMAs) only make up about one third of the 
detention population, and that as the population of so-called IMAs in detention has dropped, the number 
of people in immigration detention ‘whose visa has been cancelled based on character grounds’ has 
grown.21 Unsurprisingly, the Department does not explain the overlap between the categories and that 
certain IMAs have been re-detained under criminal cancellation powers, most likely because one of the 
discursive aims of the explainer is to highlight that the Government has ‘stopped the boats’ and reduced 
the number of people arriving ‘illegally’ to seek refugee protection.   
 
Up until at least 2008, there were limited exceptions to the mandatory and indefinite detention of asylum 
seekers arriving in Australia without authorisation. The routine and indefinite detention of onshore 
asylum seekers was foregrounded as a key mode of both deterrence and border control. As Billings has 
tracked, discretionary powers, which permitted release of asylum seekers from detention in limited 
                                                           
17 Silverman and Massa 2012, p. 679. 
18 Silverman and Nethery 2015, p. 2. 
19 Department of Home Affairs n.d. 
20 Department of Home Affairs n.d. 
21 Department of Home Affairs n.d. Note, the conservative Liberal Government uses the terminology of ‘illegal maritime 
arrival’ as a matter of policy even though the statutory language is ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ as described above. The 
rhetoric of illegality is of course contested, and is used to criminalise those entering without a valid immigration status. 
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circumstances, were seldom used due to a ‘risk-averse and security-focused culture within the 
Immigration Department’.22 Indeed, this was the case in spite of legislative changes which took place 
in 2005, giving the Minister of Immigration a non-compellable, discretionary and personal power to 
release immigration detainees from detention through the grant of a visa, where the Minister holds that 
it is ‘in the public interest to do so’.23 Under these reforms, the Minister may issue a visa independently 
or on application.24 However, for ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ a visa application cannot be made 
due to a blanket statutory bar on visa applications by asylum seekers arriving by boat. This bar may 
only be lifted at the discretion the Minister.25  
 
The 2005 reforms also introduced the option of residential housing or community detention of asylum 
seekers, primarily intended for women and families with children.26 These reforms, which ‘preserved 
the broad framework of mandatory detention but gave it a “softer” edge’,27 were in part a response to 
the indefinite, protracted detention of stateless detainees and to public revelations that permanent 
Australian residents, including Cornelia Rau and Vivian Alvarez Solon, had been unlawfully detained.28 
While the ‘public interest’ power was also used to release some highly vulnerable detainees, the power 
was primarily used to place women, children and families in community detention.  
 
The more significant, albeit still discretionary, shift in onshore detention policy and practice was 
introduced as consequence of electoral reforms promised by the Australian Labor Party, which were 
partially introduced after they came into government in 2008. As Billings records: 
 
In 2008, the Labor Government championed a new beginning to immigration detention, signalling 
a move away from a presumption of secure detention to a presumption that unlawful non-citizens 
in Australia will remain in the community pending resolution of their status. This ‘risk-based’ 
policy framework was infused by values that were more consistent with international human rights 
standards safeguarding the right to liberty. Under the policy, detention [was] to be used in limited 
circumstances and for the shortest period possible. Officially, unlawful non-citizens are initially 
detained for administrative reasons: health, identity, and security checks.29  
 
Despite the then Labor Government’s promises that law reform would take place, the reforms were not 
formalised and the Government failed to comply with its own policies of only risk-based and short-term 
detention.30 However, in November 2011, the then Labor Government formally announced 
that following health, security and identity checks, selected ‘irregular maritime arrivals’ would be 
placed into the community with work rights while their asylum claims were assessed.31 It was from this 
                                                           
22 Billings 2015, p. 1390. 
23 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 195A. 
24 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 195A. 
25 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A. Under the Migration Act, any person detained as an unlawful non-citizen must be 
informed of the right to apply for a visa, including a bridging visa, as soon as reasonably practicable after they are detained. 
⁠Only applications for a protection visa or a bridging visa are not subject to a strict two or seven day time limit for the 
making of an application once detained; see Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 194–195. 
26 Migration Amendment (Detention Arrangements) Act 2005 (Cth); see also Opeskin 2012. The reforms also made new 
provision for the oversight of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in cases where persons had been in detention for over two 
years. 
27 Opeskin 2012. 
28 Grewcock 2005. 
29 Billings 2015, p. 1391 (footnotes omitted).  
30 Billings 2015, p. 1391. 
31 These principles are set out in the Department’s policy guideline, which was announced in 2008 and still guides release 
from detention. As opposed to mandatory detention of all non-citizens, the policy establishes that three main groups will be 
subject to detention. All unauthorised arrivals for management of ‘health, security and identity’ risks; unlawful non-citizens 
who present an ‘unacceptable risk’ to the community and unlawful non-citizens who have breached previous visa conditions. 
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point onwards that large numbers of asylum seekers classified as unauthorised maritime arrivals were 
released on BVEs, with the Government ‘expecting’ that ‘100 IMAs’ would be released each month.32  
Consequently, from 25 November 2011 to 30 June 2012, 2,731 BVEs were granted to unauthorised 
maritime arrivals, and two years later, at 30 June 2014, this number had risen to 29,564.33 By 30 
September 2016, 35,834 BVEs had been granted to asylum seekers classed as unauthorised maritime 
arrivals.34 Notably, at the same time as making the announcement in 2011, then Immigration Minister 
Chris Bowen confirmed the Government remained ‘committed to maintaining a mandatory detention 
system, including using mandatory detention on Christmas Island for reception and initial checks’.35  
 
Critically, the reestablishment of offshore processing and detention centres also occurred at this time 
and signalled, amongst other things, the unsustainability of the onshore detention centres given the scale 
of onshore arrivals, which peaked in 2012/13 at a population of over 10,000 detainees.36 The 
reestablishment of the offshore policy in 2012 was due, in part, to the pressures on the mainland 
detention network and the Government’s struggles to ‘maintain a burgeoning detention network on both 
Christmas Island and the Australian mainland’.37 Simultaneously, ‘pressures on the immigration 
detention network’ from 2008 to 2013 influenced the Government’s decision to allow asylum seekers 
to ‘live in the community on bridging visas and in community detention’.38  
 
In this period, immigration detainees — who were still at the heart of the Government’s deterrence 
rhetoric — were released into the community in significant numbers, while a select population of 
asylum seekers were transferred to closed detention camps on Manus Island and Nauru to send a 
message that there was ‘no way’ boat arrivals would ever settle in Australia.39 Indeed, attention to the 
proportion of asylum seekers transferred to Nauru and Manus Island highlights the profoundly and 
cruelly arbitrary nature of the offshore camps. Even at their peak in mid-2014, the offshore detention 
centres housed approximately 2,450 asylum seekers and refugees, out of a population of 30,500 
‘eligible’ for transfer.40 The camps were intended to exist at the centre of the policy objective of 
deterrence, at the same time as large numbers of asylum seekers were released into the Australian 
community and subject to social, economic and administrative regimes of exclusion to ensure they had 
‘no advantage’ over those who had waited their turn and not sought asylum by boat.41  
  
Although I have not addressed the cost and profits associated with detention, before examining the 
release and regulation of the BVE population as a form of crimmigration control it is worth noting that 
financial cost cannot adequately explain shifts in onshore detention practice. The Australian 
Government has repeatedly demonstrated that there is no price too high for the implementation of its 
border control and deterrence policies. Indeed, what Grewcock has described as ‘the unrelenting 
mobilisation of state resources to prevent the free movement of refugees in the region’,42 is a fact that 
                                                           
These together comprise one of the seven key ‘immigration detention values’. Another sets out that ‘Detention in 
immigration detention centres is only to be used as a last resort and for the shortest practicable time’; see Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection (n.d.), chapter 1.  
32 Bowen 2011.  
33 Phillips 2017, p. 4. 
34 Phillips 2017, p. 4. 
35 Bowen 2011.  
36 Between 13 August 2012 and 24 May 2013 19,048 people arrived by boat; see Grewcock 2014, p. 73.  
37 Grewcock 2014, p. 73. 
38 Koleth 2012. 
39 Laughland 2014. 
40 Karlsen 2016.  
41 Cohen 2013.  
42 Grewcock 2014, p. 77. 
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has been welcomed and accommodated by private contractors who reap the ‘profits’ of these policies 
and expand their services accordingly.43 The relentless privatization of ‘detention services’ has gone 
hand in hand with the growth of the number of detained migrants. The creation of ‘additional capacity’ 
in detention centres simultaneously entrenches an economic motive and outcome for each contract (and 
extra bed) filled.44 This is clearly demonstrated by the expansion of immigration prisons and detention 
centres offshore and in other jurisdictions.  
 
2   Bridging Visas, Cancellation Powers and Crimmigration 
 
Crimmigration as a method highlights how asylum seekers become ‘ensnared in a stringent mesh of 
administrative, criminal and immigration laws’.45 Gerard and Vecchio have analysed how these different 
forms of regulation, law and policy work in concert to ‘entrap’ asylum seekers, both in the physical 
confinement sense and also in the criminal legal sense by creating conditions that lead to breaches of 
existing criminal laws.46 They argue that these ‘entrapping’ practices and regulatory frameworks not 
only impose conditions on and constrain asylum seeker movement and behaviour, but are themselves 
criminogenic.47 BVEs certainly cause ‘vulnerability and a daily lived experience that itself is 
criminogenic’48 and, through the production of crime and criminalised behaviour (and deviance), 
objectives of both deterrence and punishment are met. Despite this, it is also clear that BVEs holders 
continue to find ways to negotiate visa restrictions and make their lives liveable to the greatest extent 
possible under the immense emotional, social, economic and personal impact of BVEs and attached 
conditions.49  
 
Unlike mandatory indefinite detention in the past, and ‘offshore’ processing in the present, the scale of 
release, regulation and punishment of asylum seekers on bridging visas has not (at least until recently) 
been at the centre of scripts about deterrence and the criminalisation of asylum seekers in Australia.50 
Despite the quiet and opaque grants of BVEs through discretionary processes, often obscured behind 
walls of bureaucracy,51 important and ongoing work has documented the harms of bridging visas, and 
the impossibly restrictive conditions attached to them. The denial of the rights to work and access to 
welfare support (the ‘no work, no income, no Medicare’ trifecta) has amounted to enforced poverty for 
certain bridging visa holders.52 The conditions attached to BVEs have been analysed as a form of 
deportation by destitution, and more recently, as ‘starving out’ asylum seekers,53 or, as Hekmat has 
written, as weaponising food in order to pressure asylum seekers to leave.54 This strategy was more or 
less made explicit in the 2018 announcement (yet to be fully implemented) that income support for all 
                                                           
43 Grewcock 2014, p. 77. 
44 Mountz et al 2012; see also Sudbury 2005.  
45 Vecchio and Gerard 2018. 
46 Vecchio and Gerard 2018, p. 5. 
47 Vecchio and Gerard 2018, p. 5. 
48 Vecchio and Gerard 2018, p. 5.  
49 Hartley and Fleay 2017. As Vecchio and Gerard describe this elsewhere, the ‘social, legal and economic processes 
underpinning precarity’ generate the boundaries in which an individual’s existence and agency are possible; see Vecchio and 
Gerard 2018, p. 13. 
50 Pickering and Weber 2014. 
51 Welch 2012. 
52 Markus and Taylor 2006. Markus and Taylor also note the extreme complexity of how and when conditions attach, 
making the visa class itself a strategy, with the complexity further marginalising those attempting to live on BVEs. 
53 Refugee Council of Australia 2018b. 
54 Hekmat 2018. 
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BVE holders with work rights will be withdrawn, regardless of whether those affected by the changes 
actually have a current job or access to work.55  
 
Immense precarity and socio-economic vulnerability have become the trademarks of the temporary 
BVE for asylum seekers.56 These punitive conditions are exacerbated by the prolonged periods for 
which asylum seekers hold BVEs due to lengthy delays in the resolution of protection visa applications. 
For asylum seekers on BVEs, the denial of access to a subsistence level of income, to work rights (often 
simultaneously), and medical services are tactics that have been repeatedly documented to cause 
irreparable mental distress and harm. Hekmat has documented that more than 10 asylum seekers on 
bridging visas have committed suicide in the four years to April 2018.57. These visas are all too clear 
examples of how time (or specifically temporariness) and socio-economic restrictions are used as 
technologies of punishment.58 Not least among the harms of BVEs is the often short period of validity 
of each BE and the need to regularly seek entirely discretionary renewals. 
 
Due to the discretion governing the grant of BVEs and the short amount of time between renewals, to 
be released on a BVE is to live with the constant possibility of re-detention. Boon-Kuo, in analysing 
the discretion and conditionality that governs BVEs, describes the visa as an example of the state 
mobilising a ‘legal status as a mechanism of selective and arbitrary control’,59 such that ‘it is not legal 
status itself that is important for release from detention’, but the conditions imposed on that status.60 As 
well, McNevin, Correa Velez and Boon-Kuo have demonstrated how BVEs, and the conditions attached 
to them, have created relationships of dependence and/or surveillance not just with Government but 
with refugee NGOs and settlement agencies contracted by Government to provide limited or diminished 
welfare and medical support, and co-opted and corralled into community policing and surveillance.61 
This issue is plainly evidenced in the FOI data explored below.  
 
The increased use of visa cancellation powers against BVE holders, the heightened surveillance of this 
population, and the use of these mechanisms alongside systematic denials of access to work and income 
together articulate the diverse mechanisms used, in Vecchio and Gerard’s words, to ‘entrap’ asylum 
seekers. The introduction of the Asylum Seeker Code of Behaviour, which I discuss below, has also 
drastically increased both the fact and fear of surveillance, and with it the threat of re-incarceration and 
diminished capacity for agency and resistance. Examining both the Code of Behaviour and cancellation 
powers brings the use of the criminal law as an old and new method of immigration control and 
punishment back into focus in reference to asylum seekers on bridging visas. The focus on criminal 
cancellation provisions and behavioural surveillance operates alongside already criminogenic 
conditions of socio-economic precarity attached to bridging visas.  
 
2.1   Bridging Visa Cancellation Powers: Criminality Grounds and the Asylum Seeker Code of 
Behaviour 
 
As described above, work charting the negative impact of the BVE framework to BVE holders has 
frequently highlighted the social and economic harms of this visa category — alongside the temporary 
                                                           
55 Refugee Council of Australia 2018c. 
56 Boon-Kuo 2017, p. 113. 
57 Hekmat 2018. 
58 Pickering and Lambert 2002. 
59 Boon-Kuo 2017, p. 113. 
60 Boon-Kuo 2017, p. 123. 
61 Boon-Kuo 2017, p. 113. 
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nature of these visas — as the core methods of punishment and deterrence. The use of criminal and 
behavioural grounds for discretionary cancellation of BVEs not only warrants further investigation, but 
also demonstrates the adaptability of crimmigration strategies and, as argued here, bridging visas as 
core to the deterrence of refugee arrivals. Asylum seekers (whose immigration and movement has 
already been ‘criminalised’) are now also subject to the use of much more classic criminal law processes 
and powers against them, in a manner associated with populations of non-asylum seeker, non-citizens. 
To examine this issue more closely, the remainder of this chapter addresses bridging visa cancellation 
powers and the exercise of these powers against BVE holders using data acquired from the Department 
of Border Protection (as it then was) in late 2016. 
 
Alongside the wide-ranging visa cancellation powers in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’), 
including the well-known character cancellation provisions under section 501 of the Act, there are 
additional and expansive grounds for the cancellation of visas under section 116. Section 116, which 
can only be used to cancel temporary visas if the visa-holder is in the Australian migration zone and is 
immigration cleared,62 is the power under which the majority of asylum seekers’ BVEs have been 
cancelled. Section 116(g) of the Act sets out that a visa may be cancelled if a prescribed ground for 
cancelling a visa applies to the holder. Regulation 2.43 prescribes these grounds, and provides that the 
Minister may cancel a Subclass 050 (Bridging [General]) visa or a Subclass 051 (Bridging [Protection 
Visa Application]) if the Minister is satisfied that the holder has been convicted of an offence against a 
law of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or another country; or if the Minister is satisfied the 
holder has been charged (but not convicted) with an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a 
State, a Territory or another country.63 
 
These powers came in to effect in June 2013, when the Labor Government expanded Ministerial powers 
to cancel Subclass 050 and 051 visas where the visa holder was under investigation of, convicted of, or 
charged with, a criminal offence.64 The amendment was repeatedly justified on the nebulous grounds 
of ensuring the ‘safety of the Australian community’, with then Immigration Minister, Brendan 
O’Connor, stating that ‘[t]he Government has become increasingly concerned about unauthorised 
arrivals who engage in criminal conduct after being released into the community on BVEs while they 
await for the claims to be assessed’.65 No specific reasons were given to justify the Government’s 
‘increased’ concern about this population. Nor did the Government differentiate between the threat 
posed to the community by minor offences, such as traffic infringements or minor damage to property, 
and major offences, such as aggravated or sexual assault. 
 
The cancellation of BVEs under s 116(g) of the Act has been the subject of a 2016 Commonwealth 
Ombudsman Report. The investigation was conducted as an own motion initiative of the Ombudsman, 
after the Ombudsman received complaints relating to a cohort of people whose bridging visas had been 
cancelled ‘on the basis of a criminal charge, conviction, or the possibility that the person poses a threat 
to the Australian community’,66 a number of whom remained in detention long after criminal charges 
had been dropped or after having been found not guilty of the relevant charge. The report sharply 
criticised the administration of people in immigration detention who have had their BVE cancelled 
                                                           
62 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 117. 
63 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.43. The subsection also allows for cancellation in circumstances where an 
Interpol notice has been issued. 
64 The Government also introduced a new condition that could be attached to subclass 050 and 051 visas, requiring that a 
visa-holder not engage in criminal conduct. 
65 Migration Amendment (Subclass 050 and Subclass 051 Visas) Regulation 2013 (Cth) Explanatory Statement. 
66 Neave 2016, p. 1. 
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based on their commission, or suspected commission, of a crime.67 It also criticised the manner in which 
section 116(g) and accompanying regulations reverse the presumption of innocence for bridging visa-
holders, who may be detained if charged with rather than found guilty of a crime. In appraising the data 
below, this fundamental aspect of the bridging visa regime and its ousting of one of the criminal law’s 
most basic protections, must frame crimmigration analyses of visa cancellations under the Act.  
 
The other key component of bridging visa cancellation powers for asylum seekers is the Asylum Seeker 
Code of Behaviour, introduced by the Liberal–National Coalition Government in December 2013. The 
Code, which enlarges the already vast discretions relating to bridging visa cancellation, applies to all 
so-called ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ (UMA) who apply for or seek to renew a bridging visa.68 In 
order to access a bridging visa, this group of asylum seekers must sign the Code, and are thereafter 
bound by a ‘list of expectations’ about how to behave at all times while in Australia — expectations 
which range from obeying the law to refraining from spreading rumours, spitting or swearing in public, 
engaging in ‘disruptive activities’ or persistently irritating anyone. Signing and adhering to the Code is 
a precondition for an UMA either to be released from detention or to remain in the community.  
 
Data released by the Department sets out that, as at June 2016, 57,430 BVEs had been granted to asylum 
seekers who had signed the Code, which includes 54,235 BVE renewals. As I have noted with Methven 
elsewhere, in its first years of implementation there was very limited use or enforcement of the Code, 
even as it had an immense impact on the BVE holders subject to its vast and undefined prohibitions. 
The Department did not report on the number of cancellations in the Code’s first year.69 In 2015–16 the 
Department reported that 281 BVE holders had been alleged to breach the Code, but that no 
cancellations were made.70  
 
Often when the criminalisation of asylum seekers is discussed in Australia, this is a reference to the 
criminalisation of ‘unlawful’ or ‘unauthorised’ arrival; that is, the criminalisation of immigration status 
or immigration breaches. As Gerard and Pickering explain, ‘construction of refugees and migrants as 
“criminal” makes the application of criminal justice responses to irregular migration seem 
appropriate’.71 Refugees who arrive unlawfully are not only made ‘illegal’ but they are illegals; and, 
like ‘domestic’ law breakers, they are constructed as dangerous, undeserving and deviant.72 While 
refugees and asylum seekers have been classified as illegal, they have not been at the centre of 
Australian Government’s rhetoric about ‘criminal’ migrants. This is what Bosworth and Guild identify 
as the expansion of ‘governance through crime’ to migration governance through crime.73 The final 
section of this chapter describes a shift towards the ‘criminalisation’ of this population using the 
criminal law as such, and the Code of Behaviour as a proxy for the criminal law, rather than breaches 
of migration law.  
 
2.2   Data and Analysis 
 
                                                           
67 Neave 2016. 
68 See Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2013. 
69 Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2014. 
70 Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2016. In 2014-15, one BVE holder had their visa cancelled due to a 
breach of the code and 49 people were referred to service providers or Department officers to reinforce the operation of the 
Code. Some referrals were made for counselling in light of the breach or for vaguely defined ‘discussions’ with SRSS (Status 
Resolution Support Service) providers; see Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2015, pp. 51–52. 
71 Gerard and Pickering 2013, p. 287; see also Mountz 2010 
72 Bosworth 2008, p. 208; Dauvergne 2008. 
73 Bosworth and Guild 2008, p. 704; Garland 2003. 
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In late 2016, the Department partially fulfilled an FOI request seeking access to the total number of 
allegations of breaches under the Code; the nature of the alleged breach; a description of behaviour 
giving rise to the breach; a description of the complainant or reporter; and, the outcome of the allegation 
including any action taken by the Department where a breach or no breach was found for the period 
from June 2014 to July 2016.74 The Government released a table of 499 breaches and alleged breaches 
outlining this data, but also included cancellations made under ‘non-Code powers’, as the Department 
put it. In this dataset, the primary ‘non-Code’ cancellation power used was s 116(g), outlined above. 
This section sets out the content and analysis of this data to explore what it reveals about the use of 
criminal cancellation powers against asylum seekers living in the community. 
 
It is worth noting from the outset that the data in the table is best described as patchy. The table itself 
appears to be the Department’s primary record of BVE cancellations, filled in inconsistently by (one 
presumes) multiple Departmental employees. For example, not all columns have been completed for 
every allegation by the officer, or officers, entering the data. The data is nonetheless valuable. Unlike 
many available Government records, the table lists outcomes, allegations, and the source of the 
allegation, even where cancellation did not take place. In line with Boon-Kuo’s observations about 
migration policing generally, the ‘front-ending’ of discretion and the limited recording of how this 
discretion is exercised makes it very difficult to know, and therefore analyse, the details of these cases.75 
However, the table’s detailing of information beyond simply where cancellations were made already 
provides us with a more variegated picture of cancellation practices. It is also worth keeping in mind 
that the Department refused to disclose the key details of all cases where a cancellation was made for 
even the Ombudsman’s formal review of section 116(g), due to ‘resource and computer system 
limitations’.76 In this context and atmosphere, attending to this ‘top level’ data is important.  
 
The data reveals, in no uncertain terms, the regular and increasing use of section 116(g) cancellation 
powers against BVE holders during the period covered by the FOI. Of the 499 mere allegations of a 
possible breach recorded, at least 159, or one in three, allegations resulted in cancellations or non-
renewals of BVEs under non-Code powers, including specifically under section 116(g). The Ministerial 
Direction guiding the use of this power is currently under review, but at the time of writing  set out that 
‘decision-makers should have regard to the principle that the Australian Government has a low tolerance 
for criminal behaviour’ in ‘weighing the Government’s view that the prescribed grounds for cancellation 
at regulation 2.43(1)(p) and (q) should be applied rigorously’.77 Based on the dataset it is not possible 
to gain insight into the approximately 2/3 of mere allegations that did not result in visa cancellation or 
non-renewal. Notably, in 2016, the Department refused to provide the Ombudsman with any examples 
of cases in which a decision was taken not to cancel a visa under the regulations after a Notice of 
Intention to Cancel had been issued, though they reported that decisions not to cancel were ‘common’.78  
 
In the process of interpreting the 159 allegations (32%) in the FOI dataset that resulted in BVE 
cancellations, it is important to give some sense of the nature of the so-called ‘allegations’. In 55 
instances (35%), the table clearly records that cancellation took place on the basis of a criminal charge 
                                                           
74 Note that this FOI request followed on from a previous request, which requested the same information but for the period 
from the Commencement of the Code till mid-2014. 
75 Boon-Kuo 2017, pp. 29-31. 
76 The Report also noted the differing levels of detail in the case files and decisions that were able to be accessed. In 
response, the Department accepted that there was ‘capability gaps’ and a need for better training of officers. As noted in 
Neave 2016, pp. 5, 9, the Department also acknowledged ‘inconsistent record-keeping practices across states or business 
lines’ and ‘some variance in the quality of decision records’. 
77 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 2014. 
78 Neave 2016, p. 21.  
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rather than conviction. The remaining instances (65%) do not directly specify the basis for cancellation. 
However, since the table at times lists ‘fines’ or ‘sentences of imprisonment’ for these instances, a 
tentative inference is that the many allegations where a criminal sentence is not included, are the subject 
of criminal charges, not convictions. As noted, the exact statutory provision used for cancellation 
(outside the use of non-Code powers or section 116(g)) is also not listed in every instance.  
 
The other clear and significant finding from this data is that where a breach of the Code was found, this 
was most likely to result in a BVE holder being referred for counselling or to ‘a discussion’ with either 
with a Department officer or the BVE holder’s Status Resolution Support Services (SRSS) provider as 
the only action in response to the breach. Of the 192 allegations (38%), where it was found that the BVE 
holder breached the Code, in only one instance is it clear that the Code breach resulted in a visa 
cancellation, and in 163 instances (84% ) a referral for counselling or for a discussion was made.79 Read 
as a whole, it is clear that Code powers are not being used to cancel bridging visas. Overwhelmingly, 
cancellation powers are being exercised under section 116(g). In a number of instances where the 
relevant allegation may have been made (and investigation/surveillance takes place) as a result of the 
Code, cancellation took place under the legislative power. One possible implication here is that the 
Code is being used to facilitate surveillance, policing and reporting, but that criminality grounds are 
then being used to cancel the relevant visa rather than the Code itself.   As compared to the criminality 
grounds, where a charge must be laid, the standards of proof and evidence for allegations under the 
Code are much less straightforward and often rely on third party evidence or witnesses. 
 
In cases recorded by the Ombudsman, even where the AAT had set aside the Department’s decision to 
cancel a visa, asylum seekers remained in detention where the Minister had not intervened to grant a 
new visa, effectively rendering administrative review entirely ineffectual and irrelevant. This, alongside 
cases where BVEs were cancelled even though the original criminal charge was dropped, again 
demonstrates the multiple layers, stages and sites of discretion operating to control and punish the BVE 
population.80 During the Ombudsman’s period of reference a sizeable proportion of cancellations were 
in fact set aside by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Ombudsman’s report found that 
between 29 June 2013 (when the powers commenced) and 9 October 2016, 322 BVEs held by IMAs 
were cancelled under section 116(1)(g) and regulation 2.43(1)(p). Of the cancellation decisions made 
by the Department under these laws, 55 decisions were set aside by the AAT and the former Migration 
Review Tribunal.81 The cancellation of asylum seekers BVEs is an example par excellence of 
crimmigration practices significantly exceeding both crime and immigration regulation, since even if 
charges are dropped, there is no right to simply apply for another bridging visa once the existing visa is 
cancelled. Instead, the Minister must exercise a non-compellable discretion to lift the bar and then to 
grant a further visa.  
 
Type, Occurrence and Source of Allegations 
In the FOI data, the ‘type’ of alleged breach is only categorised in a very general manner (listed in a 
column titled ‘alleged breach’) and further details about each allegation are not recorded. As such, it is 
difficult to know anything beyond the broad type of the allegation. The ‘types’ of allegation can be 
divided into two groups – those that reflect existing criminal offences and those that reflect behavioural 
                                                           
79 In 18 instances no breach was found (4%), while in 66 instances (13%), the assessor decision was ‘insufficient evidence’. 
In 68 instances (14%), no assessor decision was recorded. The slight discrepancy in numbers reflects the fact that in some 
instances there was a BVE cancellation or non-renewal even though no breach was recorded, and so these are double 
counted for the purposes of outcomes. 
80 Neave 2016, pp. 11-14.  
81 Neave 2016, pp. 13.  
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norms imposed by the Code of Behaviour and do not ostensible correspond with existing criminal laws. 
Despite the minimal detail in the allegations, they nonetheless raise serious concerns about the net-
widening effect that the amorphous and ill-defined terms of the Code of Behaviour have had on the 
policing and surveillance of asylum seekers. The allegations of ‘dishonesty’ and 
‘harass/intimidate/bully’ mirror the provisions of the Code of Behaviour which exceed the criminal law 
and recognisable criminal offences. Alongside these ‘allegations’, Code-related allegations types 
included: 
▪ Threatening / verbally abusive behaviour 
▪ Sexual contact — over 18 
▪ Sexual contact — under 18 
▪ Disturbance 
▪ Public nuisance 
▪ Self-harm 
▪ Uncooperative to resolution of status 
▪ Anti-social/ disruptive behaviour  
 
As Methven and I have argued elsewhere, offences under the Code and its ‘perverse preoccupation with 
the subject of manners [and behaviour] is consistent with colonial, civilising discourses’ requiring 
racialised ‘others’ to learn from and adopt the customs of the new host state over their own cultures.82 
Further, since most breaches of the Code resulted in counselling or a discussion with service providers, 
the disciplining effect of Code, even in the absence of a visa cancellation or other forms of penalty is 
clear.   
 
The breach types that reflect existing criminal offences range from ‘theft/larceny/shoplifting’ and 
‘driving offences’ to assault and aggravated sexual assault. However, outside of the breaches that appear 
to be related to the Code’s expanded and undefined behavioural norms, the minor nature of many of the 
criminal charges or allegations that resulted in cancellation is of concern. The Ombudsman’s Report 
addressed not only the erosion of the presumption of innocence where cancellation occurs on the basis 
of a charge alone, but also the lack of proportionality where decisions are made ‘to cancel a visa under 
[regulation 2.43] in relation to charges that sit on the more minor end of the spectrum’.83 The 
Ombudsman also noted anecdotal reports that ‘in some cases the department issued the [notice of 
intention to cancel] to the visa holder as they were leaving court having just been granted bail’, noting 
that one of the factors in bail grants is whether unacceptable risk will be posed to the community.84  
  
In terms of the occurrence rates of particular classes of breach or offence, driving offences made up 
over a quarter (28% or 139/499) of all alleged breaches. Of the 138 allegations based on driving 
offences, 20 per cent of these led to BVE cancellation. These offences are not described beyond this 
categorisation. However, offences such as driving without a valid license or driving unregistered cars 
must be read in light of the criminogenic nature of BVE holders’ limited access to work and income 
support. The flow-on effects or ‘entrapment’ caused by living without  regular or adequate income 
include barriers to accessing public transport, licences, and valid vehicle insurance and registration.  
 
The next highest incidence of alleged breaches were assault (14%), followed by domestic violence 
(10%) and drug offences (5%). Once again, the severity of these offences is unclear but even in the 
absence of further detail, the allegation types raise at least two concerns. First, what processes are 
followed to investigate high level allegations like domestic violence where no visa cancellation action 
is taken or no corresponding criminal charges are laid. Second, for broadly categorised offences like 
                                                           
82 Vogl and Methven 2015, p. 179.  
83 Neave 2016, p. 8. 
84 Neave 2016, p. 8. 
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driving offences, the charge may range from driving an unregistered vehicle to dangerous driving, 
raising the question of whether visa cancellation is taking place for minor infringements and if 
cancellation is a proportionate response? On this latter question, the Ombudsman Report noted that ‘it 
appears that the department tends towards cancellation of a visa even if the charge is not serious’; and 
rightly queried whether  a person charged, or even convicted, of minor matters ‘such as shoplifting or 
a minor traffic offence’ should be detained.85  
 
The Code and bridging visa cancellation powers are clearly instruments for increased surveillance, 
heightened self-policing and day to day precarity for asylum seekers. This fact is also evident in the 
reporting patterns and source of allegations recorded in the FOI dataset. The column recording the 
source of allegations reveals that 61 per cent of allegations (301 out of 499) originated from the 
organisations providing the asylum seeker with resettlement services and assistance (SRSS providers). 
The next highest source was the ‘National Allegation Assessment Team Dob-in Line’, which was 
responsible for 9 per cent of allegations. ‘Police’ only accounted for 5 per cent of allegations, and ‘case 
workers’ accounted for another 3 per cent.86  
 
The table clearly reveals the participation of charity and non-government and settlement organisations 
in the surveillance, policing and reporting of asylum seeker behaviour, and that these organisations are 
at the centre of the operation of both the Code and section 116(g) cancellations. The statistics regarding 
the source of allegations reinforces Weber’s account of the ever-expanding web of agents who police, 
surveil and report on asylum seeker and non-citizen populations — a network of policing and reporting 
much wider than networks of surveillance and law enforcement experienced by certain classes of 
citizens.87 Both the source of allegations and the type of ‘alleged breach’ warrant significant further 
investigation. This would include investigation into the status of reporting requirements in SRSS 
contracts, which are not publically available, and the approach of organisations to these obligations, as 
well as into the details of the ‘top level’ descriptions of breaches (such as driving offences and sexual 
contact), and outcomes in the criminal justice system of the charges that triggered visa cancellations. 
  
There is clearly more work to be done and further data required, to interrogate both the data in the table, 
and the implications of breach allegations and visa cancellations. Indeed, one pressing, further question 
arising from this data is whether all those with visa cancellations are being re-detained, given the 
shrinking population of onshore asylum seekers currently being held in immigration detention and the 
increasing number of visa cancellations. An FOI on this exact question was made to the Department but 
at the time of writing the request had been refused on the basis that the Department held ‘no current 
reports or systems’ to exact the information.88 I also note that the statistics recounted here are not 
gendered and do not reveal other conditions on BVEs, such as access to work rights or to the SRSS. 
  
While this chapter does not address details about the management of BVE cancellations and 
consequences of these cancellations once they have been made, the Ombudsman’s Report into the 
                                                           
85 Neave 2016, p. 8. 
86 The nature of the case worker is not explained, so this could refer to an SRSS provider or other kind of worker. Note some 
‘sources’ are difficult to identify without further information from the Department. For example, ‘compliance’ were 
responsible for six allegations. 
87 Weber 2013.  
88 FOI Request FA 18/03/00501. Note that Louise Boon-Kuo has traced aspects of the gap between rhetoric regarding a 
‘universal visa system’ and instances where the Government has permitted non-citizens ‘to stay in the Australian community 
without a visa’. This included a period between 2014–15 where the Department stopped renewing bridging visas but 
advocates witnessed that simultaneously, those with expired BVEs were not being re-detained; see Boon-Kuo 2017, p. 131. 
Also, in Departmental reports on BVE holders in the Community, the Department has recorded 1815 people awaiting the 
grant of a further BVE. As noted in Refugee Council of Australia 2018d, 'This means that these people do not currently have 
lawful permission to stay in the community, and do not have current rights to work, study or access Medicare’. 
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exercise of section 116(g) shows that, due to gross delays and mismanagement of immigration 
detention, BVEs are not reissued (at the Minister’s discretion) even where the charges which formed 
the basis for the cancellation were dropped. At the same time, BVE cancellations endure while criminal 
charges are on foot and so, ‘due to delays in local court systems, people may have to wait months in 
detention before their charges can be heard by the courts’, adding to the uncertainty they face.89 While 
some crimmigration scholarship has noted the theoretically stronger protection of liberty under criminal 
law and process, the BVE holders in detention awaiting delayed criminal trials exist at the crossover of 
the worst excesses, mismanagement and injustices of both systems.  
 
3. Conclusion 
The adaptive nature of crimmigration control and its non-linear shifts makes living at the intersection 
of criminal and immigration laws, policies and discretions unpredictable, precarious and harmful.90 In 
thinking about further research in this area, it is worthwhile recalling one of the areas for future research 
identified by Gerard and Pickering back in 2013; namely the need for more empirical research to 
document the lived experience of crimmigration control and powers.91 Important research since that 
time has extended the frame of reference beyond state forms of control to asylum seekers’ experience 
of and resistance to punitive policies;92 and as regimes of control intensify, further scholarship 
addressing these questions is urgent and necessary. As Gerard and Pickering observe, ‘unless you 
address the resistance and coping mechanisms adopted by subjects, you will be oversimplifying the 
perception of irregular migrants as either “victims” of exploitation or “villains” who break the law’.93  
 
This chapter has argued that in order to fully understand mandatory detention as a form of immigration 
control and deterrence of asylum seekers in Australia, closer attention needs to be paid to the regime of 
temporary, discretionary release from detention through BVEs and the subsequent regulation and 
policing of bridging visa holders living in the community. The release of onshore asylum seekers from 
Australian-based detention centres on bridging visas is a practice that is more than ancillary to 
immigration detention — it is central to Government strategies of punishment and deterrence of asylum 
seekers. Further, the vast discretions that govern release from detention and the socio-economic 
marginalisation of the bridging visa population must be read alongside the heightened use of BVE 
cancellation powers and threat of re-detention. New mechanisms for policing and surveillance as a 
result of the Asylum Seeker Code of Behaviour and existing cancellation powers, which allow for re-
detention on the basis of behavioural norms, criminal convictions and charges, exceed the operation of 
the criminal law and form part of an expanding regime for the surveillance, control and punishment of 
asylum seekers living in the community.   
 
  
                                                           
89 Neave 2016, p. 20. 
90 Sklansky 2012.  
91 Gerard and Pickering 2013.  
92 Fleay et al. 2013; Hartley and Fleay 2017.  
93 Gerard and Pickering 2013; see also Anderson and Ruhs 2010.  
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